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September 1, 2026
Pritha Pahari, The Core
1 September 2026
Reliance has spent more than a decade bringing together a long list of names such as Burberry and Tiffany & Co. to India. Its latest focus seems to be luxury celebrity brands, adding global pop star Rihanna’s Fenty Beauty and now media personality Kim Kardashian’s shapewear label SKIMS to its luxury brands portfolio.
Isha Ambani, executive director of Reliance Retail, has fronted most of these announcements herself.
Meanwhile, Nykaa, the beauty platform Reliance Retail keeps getting compared to, spent the last year going after some of the same celebrity founders.
In August 2025, Fenty Beauty moved from Nykaa’s platform to an exclusive deal with Reliance’s Sephora India and Tira. In June 2026, Nykaa answered by signing pop star Selena Gomez’s Rare Beauty. A month later, Reliance landed SKIMS.
India’s luxury and celebrity-brand market is split between Reliance’s scale and Nykaa’s beauty expertise, with Fenty, Rare Beauty and SKIMS showing how ownership, reach and brand fit are shaping who gets the biggest names.
Big Brands, Different Bets
Reliance wins brands through scale (20,169 stores, 396 million customers) and ownership ties; Fenty’s move to Sephora India is less a market choice than an internal LVMH routing decision, given LVMH’s stakes in both Fenty and Sephora.
But Nykaa is holding its own by competing on specialism, not size; its beauty-literate audience and curated community pulled in Rare Beauty and Chanel.
The brand fit, not just distribution muscle, still decides who signs where, and some brands (like Birkenstock) skip both platforms entirely.
The economics behind these deals are harder to pin down than the headlines suggest. None of the three — Fenty, Rare Beauty, or SKIMS — have disclosed minimum guarantees, royalty rates, or sales targets for their India entries; these are announced as partnerships, not filed joint ventures.
SKIMS raised $225 million in November 2025 at a $5 billion valuation, nearing $1 billion in annual net sales.
Fenty tells a different story: $450 million in 2024 sales, now valued at $1-2 billion, down sharply from a $2.8 billion estimate in 2021, with Jay-Z’s MarcyPen Capital Partners in talks to buy LVMH’s stake.
Rare Beauty’s India entry rides on Nykaa’s own momentum; the company’s revenue from operations rose 29% year on year (YoY) to Rs 2,782 crore in Q1 FY27, up from Rs 2,154.9 crore a year earlier. In the last quarter of FY26, revenue stood at Rs 2,648.1 crore.
The Core has reached out to Reliance and Nykaa for their response, and will update this report if and when they respond.
Why Fenty Chose Reliance
Fenty’s move looks more like an internal one, according to Suumit Kapoor, a brand growth consultant.
LVMH owns 50% of Fenty Beauty through its beauty incubator Kendo Brands, a stake it has held since co-founding the brand with Rihanna in 2017. LVMH also owns Sephora globally, and Sephora in India is run by Reliance.
“When Fenty enters a new market through Sephora, LVMH is effectively distributing its own equity stake through its own global retail infrastructure,” Kapoor said. For a brand with that kind of ownership overlap, he added, the choice of partner is “close to an internal routing decision” and not a genuine trade-off.
That ownership overlap is itself now in a pickle.
LVMH has been exploring a sale of its 50% Fenty stake since October 2025, working with investment bank Evercore, according to Reuters. As of June 2026, American rapper and businessman, Jay-Z’s investment firm MarcyPen Capital Partners was reported to be among the parties in talks to buy it.
No sale has closed yet, so the Reliance-Sephora-LVMH alignment still holds for now, but it isn’t guaranteed to outlast the current ownership structure.
Fenty’s India journey backs this up. The brand’s first India listing wasn’t through Reliance at all.
It ran on Nykaa’s Cross Border Store, a low-commitment digital shelf that was discontinued before Fenty’s August 2025 relaunch, an exclusive omnichannel deal with Reliance spanning more than 50 stores across 16 cities on day one.
Kapoor doesn’t think of the switch as a deliberate strategic upgrade.
“The Cross Border Store listing may simply have underperformed on its own terms, without much marketing support behind it,” he said, adding that there is no clear evidence that Reliance stole the brand away.
Devangshu Dutta, founder of the research firm Third Eyesight, said celebrity backing only buys a brand little room.
“When a company or an investor buys into an early-stage celebrity brand, they are acquiring instant brand equity which acts as a top-of-the-funnel magnet and potentially lower CAC,” he said. “However, the ‘fame premium’ runs out if product and service execution isn’t compelling enough to drive repeat business and customer retention.”
Ownership decides the biggest deals before “competition” even enters the picture, Fenty landed at Reliance’s Sephora because LVMH owns half of each, though that alignment is shakier than it looks, with Jay-Z’s MarcyPen Capital Partners now the leading bidder for LVMH’s Fenty stake.
Beyond ownership, it’s a straight trade-off.
For brands chasing scale, Reliance’s tens of thousands of stores will get you reach. If brands want to chase community, Rare Beauty did by picking Nykaa specifically to tap its affluent, digitally engaged beauty shoppers and build loyalty. Some brands skip the fight altogether, like Birkenstock, which walked into India solo.
The Distribution Gap
Where Reliance doesn’t need an ownership story to make its case is scale. Reliance Retail closed the quarter ended June 2026 with 20,169 stores across 78.4 million square feet, 396 million registered customers, and 568 million transactions in that single quarter, up 46% year on year, according to the company’s Q1 FY27 earnings release. JioMart alone served 5,500 pincodes through its rapid delivery network in the same period.
Nykaa, by comparison, operated 324 physical stores across 105 cities as of its FY26 numbers, with a cumulative customer base of around 42 million, per its own disclosures and Business Standard’s reporting on the company’s results.
“That gap generally buys a brand not just bigger numbers, but reaches into places where a beauty specialist has no reason to be,” Kapoor said. For brands thinking beyond beauty into wellness, gifting, or lifestyle crossovers, he said that scale “is not a nice-to-have. It is the entire argument for choosing Reliance over a beauty-only platform.”
Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, a research firm, made a similar point on Reliance’s pull with brands weighing an India entry.
“With the kind of strength they have, they can always give a better deal,” he said, referring to Reliance’s ability to commit capital and guarantee scale that a newer entrant typically cannot promise on its own. He pointed to Reliance’s existing retail relationships, including Marks & Spencer, as part of the track record that makes brands comfortable signing with the group.
Experts say over the past two to three years, Nykaa has been the more prolific launch platform for major international beauty brands, while Reliance has had greater strength in international luxury and fashion.
According to experts, Nykaa reported more than 70 luxury-brand additions over the last three years, including names such as NARS, Prada Beauty, La Prairie, Chanel Beauty, Armani Beauty and Maison Margiela. Reliance, meanwhile, has built a luxury portfolio spanning Valentino, Balenciaga, Bottega Veneta, Tiffany & Co., Burberry and others, and most recently brought SKIMS to India. Reliance’s public disclosures do not provide a comparable 2–3-year count of new international brand entries.
Reliance is arguably a major gateway for international luxury/fashion, but calling it the default gateway for international brands overall is too broad.
Where Nykaa Still Wins
Reliance’s advantage on raw numbers doesn’t fully explain why Nykaa keeps landing brands too.
Nykaa built its beauty audience before it built its stores, using tutorials and curated storytelling to create what Kapoor called “a beauty-literate customer base that arrives already primed to trust the platform’s recommendations.”
That specialism is what pulled in Rare Beauty. Nykaa’s June 2026 launch made the brand available through its website, app, and 30 stores nationwide, and came from a company reporting its highest quarterly profit since listing at the time, per its own disclosures.
In a company statement announcing the launch, Anchit Nayar, Nykaa Beauty’s executive director and CEO, said the brand fit a “new generation of highly informed and globally engaged consumers seeking elevated brand experiences.” Rare Beauty’s chief executive, Scott Friedman, said in the same announcement that India was “a very important market” for the brand, citing Nykaa’s beauty community in the country as the reason to partner with it specifically.
Nykaa has run a similar playbook before. Chanel strengthened its India fragrance and beauty presence on Nykaa in 2025, Obagi Medical entered India through the platform specifically for its clinically driven skincare positioning, and Estee Lauder’s incubation arm has run its India beauty programme, Beauty and You, with Nykaa as lead partner every year since 2022.
Dutta pointed to Kay Beauty, Nykaa’s own celebrity line with actor Katrina Kaif, as an example of why platform fit matters as much as platform size. Contrasting it with 82°E, actor Deepika Padukone’s skincare brand on Tira, he said Kay Beauty had two advantages: it was priced for a much larger audience, and it had “Nykaa’s active participation across channels for merchandising and visibility.”
Not The Only Door
Reliance’s pull is real, but it isn’t the only route into India.
Reliance benefits from international-brand partnerships through retail economics, distribution and, in some cases, ownership or joint-venture economics. The potential conflict emerges because Reliance can simultaneously act as a brand’s market-entry partner and control substantial retail and digital routes to consumers. Public filings, however, do not establish that Reliance uses this position to disadvantage partner brands or competing retailers.
Meena pointed to Birkenstock, which entered by opening its own stores rather than partnering with either platform. Birkenstock and similar labels operate as single-brand retail; they can use India’s foreign direct investment rules to set up shop directly, bypassing the need for a local partner altogether.
“If the brands think that they have enough pull in the market and they can bring customers, they are opening these stores without any partnership,” Meena said. He added that most global brands take the partner route anyway because India, for many of them, is still a small share of global sales, and testing the market with an established partner for a few years is lower risk than building from scratch.
Kapoor flagged one risk worth watching no matter which partner a brand picks. Exclusive deals give a retailer more control. But Tira has also started building its own private-label products, including a colour cosmetics line, and sells them in the same stores as the global brands it distributes.
“A retailer can be a brand’s distribution partner and, on an adjacent shelf, its competitor, at the same time,” he said, a tension he noted that Nykaa’s marketplace model, without a comparable private label push against premium brands, does not carry in the same way.
For brands already tied to Reliance through ownership, like Fenty, there isn’t much of a decision to make. For everyone else, Nykaa signing Rare Beauty and Reliance signing SKIMS within weeks of each other shows this fight for celebrity founders in India is far from over.
(Published in The Core)
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August 6, 2026
Pritha Pahari, The Core
5 Aug 2026
Saurav, a 27-year-old resident of Navi Mumbai, has bought the same tub of whey protein for three years, same brand, same 1kg pack, same monthly ritual after his gym membership renews.
Last month, at checkout, the price had jumped by nearly a thousand rupees. He assumed it was maybe a limited-time markup. But when he checked his order history, he noticed that the price had been going up for two to three months until it crossed a threshold that made him realise that whey protein has gradually become more expensive.
India is the world’s largest milk producer, yet it imports most of its whey protein because its dairy sector was never built to make cheese, the one thing that whey needs to exist.
That gap is now colliding with a global protein boom, driven partly by weight-loss drugs that leave patients needing more protein.
The result is a price rise that is now reaching the local pharmacy and fitness stores, and one that is unlikely to recede.
The Price Move
Research firm, The Daily Datum analysed Keepa price data for 11 whey protein SKUs on Amazon and found an average price increase of 32% and a median rise of 27% across varying tracking periods.
Keepa is a third-party price-tracking tool for Amazon, it logs a product’s price history over time by continuously scraping Amazon’s listing pages, so you can see a graph of how a specific SKU’s price has moved (sales, hikes, restocks) going back months or years.
Prices of different types of proteins i.e. blends, isolates and concentrates have all moved by similar amounts, and so have Indian D2C brands and long-established imported ones.
In protein powder terms, concentrates are ~70-80% protein (less processed, retain more fats/carbs), isolates are ~90%+ protein (more filtered, less lactose/fat), and blends mix two or more protein types (e.g., whey + casein, or whey concentrate + isolate) to combine benefits like fast and slow absorption.
The one outlier, MuscleBlaze’s premium Biozyme Performance line, has roughly doubled, but excluding it, the category average is still 26%, about five times India’s headline food inflation, which stood at 5.32% year-on-year in June 2026, according to government data.
The retail prices are only a reflection of what is happening with the raw ingredients needed for whey.
Imported whey protein concentrate landed in India at roughly Rs 700–800 per kg in 2024; by mid-2026, the industry estimates put it at Rs 2,300–3,000 per kg, a rise of over 200%.
Brands have absorbed much of that shock through smaller pack sizes and blended formulations rather than passing it straight through, which is why retail prices have risen a fraction of what the raw material has.
For scale, India’s protein supplement market (powders, bars and ready-to-drink shakes together) is put at roughly $860 million to just over $1 billion in 2025, though the exact figure depends a lot on which research firm and which product categories you ask (IMARC Group and Grand View Research land in that range but don’t agree closely). That compares with a global protein supplements market well above $30 billion.
Not A Farmed Commodity
“You don’t milk a cow for whey. You milk a cow for milk. And then you have to make cheese,” said Rajiv Mitra, Strategic Advisor, Sonai Dairy, a Maharashtra based dairy.
Whey from cheese-making is “sweet whey”, protein-rich and further processed through filtration and expensive drying infrastructure into the 80–90% protein concentrate that ends up in a gym-goer’s scoop.
“This is a structural bottleneck,” Mitra said. “It’s not a kind of seasonal commodity up and down.” New filtration and drying plants can take two to four years to build, with much of the machinery imported.
This is where India’s dairy habits work against it.
Devangshu Dutta, founder of the retail consultancy Third Eyesight, while speaking to The Core explained that globally, about 95% of whey protein comes as a co-product of Western-style hard and semi-hard cheeses such as cheddar and mozzarella. India’s dairy sector, by contrast, is built around paneer, curd, khoya and ghee.
Paneer is made by acid coagulation, which produces “acid whey”, lower in protein and higher in minerals, and not suitable for concentration into protein powder.
“Unless consumption of western-style cheeses grows dramatically in India, co-production capacity will remain low,” Dutta said.
Mitra makes the same point from the kitchen rather than the factory floor: squeeze lemon into milk to make paneer at home and the liquid that separates out simply gets drained. “Traditionally, for years, while we have been the highest producer of milk, our consumption pattern is such that we do not harness the whey that is produced,” he said.
That liquid is easy to overlook because it looks like nothing more than watery runoff, but it isn’t a waste.
When milk curdles, the solid part becomes paneer or cheese, and the yellowish liquid left behind, the whey, still carries a meaningful share of the milk’s protein along with lactose and minerals.
Filtered, concentrated and dried at an industrial scale, that liquid becomes the powder sold in tubs as whey protein concentrate or isolate. In most Indian kitchens it is simply poured away; in a cheese-and-whey-processing economy like the US or Europe’s, it is captured and turned into a saleable ingredient.
That gap between what gets thrown out and what gets processed is the crux of the shortage.
Why It’s Getting More Expensive
India imports an estimated 80–90% of its supplement-grade whey, mostly from the US, Europe, New Zealand and Australia, in dollars. The rupee has weakened sharply against the dollar over the past few years, from around 74 to nearly 97 by July 2026, adding another 10–15% to landed cost before customs and tax.
India’s own import policy adds a further layer of cost. Dairy is among the most protected sectors in the Indian economy: duties on whey, cheese and milk powder run 30–60% depending on the product, India offers no duty-free quota for dairy, and the government has repeatedly kept dairy outside trade negotiations, including in the interim India–US trade agreement reached in early 2026.
US suppliers, the world’s largest whey producers, also frequently fall short of the vegetarian-rennet certification Indian food rules require, which further narrows where Indian buyers can import from. None of this caused the current price spike, but it does mean India pays a built-in premium over the raw international price, and there is no sign of that premium being negotiated away soon.
Global demand, meanwhile, keeps climbing while milk output in the US and Europe grows only slowly. The global whey protein market is put at roughly $9.7 billion in 2025 by one widely cited estimate (Grand View Research).
It has clearly grown a lot over the past decade, but market-research firms disagree fairly widely on the starting point and pace of that growth.
Mitra pointed to a newer driver on top of the usual sports-nutrition demand: GLP-1 weight-loss drugs.
“Doctors have asked patients to consume more protein” to offset muscle loss from the drugs, he said, and as patents expire and generics spread to India and China, “the demand-supply gap is definitely going to increase further.”
(Some industry commentary points to semaglutide patents lapsing in markets including India and China around 2026, which would open the door to cheaper generics, though this detail comes from a single industry source and is worth treating as a general trend rather than a confirmed date.)
He laid out what he called a three-pronged squeeze: India’s own GLP-1 users will need more protein even as domestic production stays constrained; the US and Europe, which used to export surplus whey, will increasingly consume it themselves as their own GLP-1 use grows; and India’s roughly 30% vegetarian population, which depends on dairy for protein, will lean on it even harder.
Ingredient suppliers and dairy processors abroad broadly back this account, at least directionally, though they are careful not to call GLP-1 the sole cause. In wire-service and trade-press interviews, executives at FrieslandCampina and Lactalis have cited the weight-loss drug trend by name as a reason for new investment in high-protein whey processing, and StoneX’s dairy consulting head has said the food industry simply lacks the capacity to turn whey into the concentrates and isolates the market now wants. Those are real, on-record statements, but they’re a handful of quotes, not a market-wide survey, so it would be a stretch to read them as proof that GLP-1 is now a dominant driver.
The macro numbers, where they exist, suggest a more modest picture: one investment-bank estimate (cited secondhand rather than pulled from the original research note) put GLP-1’s impact on total European calorie demand at around a quarter of one percent, since only a low single-digit percentage of the population is on the drugs so far.
Separately, some retail-data providers have reported that households with a GLP-1 user spend noticeably more on protein-rich products than matched non-user households.
Taken together, traditional sports-nutrition and everyday-fitness demand almost certainly remains the larger base of whey consumption, GLP-1 use is a real and fast-growing add-on that industry executives say is starting to show up in sourcing decisions, but nobody has published a solid, independently verified number for how much of the current price spike GLP-1 specifically accounts for. Anyone who tells you an exact percentage is guessing.
Who Feels It First?
Large manufacturers are better insulated than small ones.
“The bigger players always get into long-term contracts,” Mitra said. Smaller brands and contract manufacturers, reliant on buying at spot prices, “get squeezed first.”
Big companies can also cross-subsidise from other product lines for a while, he said, but that isn’t a permanent fix: “Businesses are not there to absorb cost. Businesses are there to make profit.” Margin compression, in his words, “is never sustainable.”
An executive at HealthKart, which owns MuscleBlaze, was quoted saying in an Financial Express article that whey concentrate costs have more than tripled in two years and are “quickly approaching 4x,” and that the company has raised prices while absorbing part of the increase itself.
The founder of Wellbeing Nutrition was quoted in the same Financial Express article saying whey isolate prices have roughly tripled over the same period, and that whey, which makes up 15–20% of the company’s revenue, is now being promoted less actively as a result.
The founder of The Whole Truth, a clean-label brand that also uses cashews and cocoa, was quoted in the same article in Financial Express, saying input costs across its ingredient list have surged and that the company has pushed through several price increases, including a 15–20% hike on protein bars, rather than change its recipe.
Budget-focused brands such as Nakpro, AS-IT-IS and Avvatar have not made similar public statements, but their pricing sits in the same band as the rest of the market, and their category positioning, cheaper, no-frills whey aimed at price-sensitive buyers, looks consistent with the same cost pressure, even without a direct quote confirming it.
Smaller sachet and single-serve formats, which let a brand hold a lower shelf price even as the cost per kilogram rises, have also become more common across the category over the past year, though this is more an observed pattern than something brands have explained on the record.
Consumers shouldn’t expect quick relief either. “Commodity prices normally fall before retail prices,” Mitra said.
Existing contracts and retail pricing cycles are sticky, so the consumer will see relief much later than any drop in the raw material.
Some Headroom, No Quick Fix
Both experts see room for India to produce more eventually.
Dutta noted that rising protein-consciousness and GLP-1 adoption are giving Indian manufacturers “headroom for growth,” though feedstock constraints will remain a challenge.
Mitra talked about the scale needed: new capacity requires a couple of hundred crores of investment and years to commission, on top of a slow, generational shift in how Indians eat dairy. Cold storage for hard cheeses, which need months of ageing, is also still being built out.
Some of that investment is already happening.
Amul has launched a whey protein line priced well below imported brands, part of a broader push by Indian dairy majors to move into higher-margin, value-added products; cheese and whey can carry margins of 25–45%, against much thinner margins on liquid milk.
Parag Milk Foods already sells whey protein under its Avvatar brand and has positioned itself as a nutrition company rather than a pure dairy one.
Milky Mist, which is preparing a stock market listing, has said it will use part of the proceeds to add new production lines for whey protein concentrate, yoghurt and cream cheese at its Tamil Nadu plant.
Cheese-focused players including Schreiber Dynamix, Britannia Bel Foods and Lactalis India are separately expanding capacity, since more cheese production is what generates more whey as a by-product in the first place.
None of these projects will materially add to supply in the next year or two; dairy-processing plants of this kind typically take two to four years from investment to commissioning, and most industry estimates suggest India’s domestic whey production still covers only a small fraction of what the country consumes.
Neither expert expects plant-based protein to substitute for whey in a hurry. “Whey still offers a superior amino acid profile” and better digestibility, Mitra said, predicting diversification and hybrid blends rather than replacement.
What Could Break the Cycle?
Globally, the shortage is widely described by dairy analysts as a processing bottleneck rather than a milk shortage: milk supply itself has been broadly stable, and cheese production, which generates whey, has continued at normal levels. The constraint is the specialised filtration and drying capacity needed to turn liquid whey into the concentrated, dried powder the supplement industry uses, and that capacity takes years to build.
Major producers, including Glanbia, Fonterra, Arla, Tirlán and Idaho Milk Products, have announced billions of dollars of new whey-processing investment in the US, Europe and New Zealand over the past year. Most of these projects are expected to come online through 2027, not before, so global analysts generally don’t expect meaningful supply relief until late 2026 at the earliest, and more likely 2027.
US milk production is forecast to keep growing gradually into 2027 as well, which should help at the margin, though rising input costs (energy, feed, financing) are also squeezing dairy farmer margins in exporting regions, which cuts the other way.
For India specifically, easing would most likely need several things to move together over the next two to three years: new domestic processing capacity from players like Amul, Parag, Milky Mist and the cheese-focused majors actually coming online, rather than merely being announced; global WPC and WPI supply catching up with demand as the 2026–27 capacity wave lands; a stabler or stronger rupee, since a large share of India’s whey is still imported and priced in dollars; and some change to India’s own tariff and certification structure on dairy imports, which currently adds cost on top of the global price and shows no sign of loosening given how firmly successive governments have kept dairy out of trade deals.
GLP-1-driven demand would also need to plateau rather than keep accelerating as drug prices fall and generics spread.
Even if all of that happens, retail prices in India are unlikely to fall quickly. Brands are currently absorbing part of the cost increase rather than passing all of it through, which means a chunk of any future relief in the raw material would likely go toward rebuilding margins before it reaches the shelf.
Contracts, inventory cycles and psychological pricing (brands are usually slower to cut prices than to raise them) add further lag. Mitra’s framing captures this: raw material costs typically fall before retail prices do, and the gap between the two can run into quarters, not weeks.
What experts keep coming back to is that this has stopped being a niche fitness-industry story. “
This is no longer just about dairy,” Mitra said. It is now about healthcare, pharmaceuticals, nutrition, overall food.
(Published in The Core)
admin
July 20, 2026
Kartikay Kashyap, Financial Express / Brandwagon
30 July 2026
Wendy’s first foray into India’s quick service restaurant (QSR) market in 2015 remained a non-starter. Sierra Nevada Restaurants, the then master franchisee, could not scale its retail presence beyond four conventional restaurants concentrated largely in Delhi-NCR. This limited physical availability, brand awareness and ordering frequency.
Ten years on and under a new master franchisee Rebel Foods since 2023, Wendy’s seems to have turned over a new leaf. With more than 250 stores, and ₹200 crore in revenues, the brand wants to be the one-stop destination for the younger generation where consumers come together to celebrate food, music and a sense of community. “The longer-term ambition is to expand to approximately 500 locations by 2028 through a combination of delivery kitchens and physical restaurants,” says Joy Bamania, brand head, Wendy’s India.
As a first step, Rebel Foods recently opened what it calls its “dynamic cultural flagship store” in Delhi’s vibrant student hub of Hudson Lane, GTB Nagar. The two-level youth-centric space blends food, music and anime, offering fans experiences like live rap battles, meet-and-greets, and specialised menu items like the signature Teriyaki Burger range.
“It has been designed to be livelier, more youthful and visually engaging—an Instagram-worthy space. It is a physical expression of how we want consumers to experience Wendy’s in India: bold, fun, culturally relevant and full of energy,” says Bamania.
Even before taking over Wendy’s operations Rebel Foods had been managing its delivery-only cloud kitchens since 2020 and was familiar with the brand’s DNA and what was required to mount a serious challenge in the ₹15,000-plus crore organised burger restaurants market in the country. The low capex delivery-only model has helped to improve its gross margins, but taking on established brands like McDonalds, KFC and Burger King would be a completely new ball game.
Is the latecomer up to a second bout in the ring?
New, improved
Wendy’s has at least three things going against it. It arrived late on India’s shores and couldn’t really stand apart during its last outing. “No matter how big a global brand you are, you need to stand out in the clutter,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder & CEO, Third Eyesight.
So while McDonald’s is the kid-first family restaurant, Burger King is intentionally “imperfect” and rides on humour, pop-culture moments, and viral marketing. Wendy’s, say experts, had no differentiation than just being a global brand.
Its premium pricing was another bugbear. In its first foray, Wendy’s tried to justify its higher prices saying its ingredients were better than that offered by the rest of the pack. So while the price of a Wendy’s entry level burger was ₹100, McDonald’s retailed one at half that price. “In the QSR business, you have to get your price right. There is nothing ‘premium’ in that space,” says Ankur Bisen, senior partner, The Knowledge Company. Rebel Foods addressed these problems with four fundamental shifts.
First, it used the existing technology, kitchen and supply-chain infrastructure to rapidly expand Wendy’s beyond Delhi-NCR. Second, it built a stronger and more accessible value architecture while introducing flavours suited to Indian preferences. Third, it created an omnichannel model in which cloud kitchens delivered reach and convenience, while selected dine-in restaurants built visibility and deeper brand experiences. Finally, it adopted a data-led approach to menu development, pricing, consumer feedback and operational performance.
Rebel Foods became Wendy’s master franchisee in India in 2023. At that stage, Wendy’s had approximately 90 locations across 19 cities. By March 2025, the brand had reached 200 locations across more than 50 cities, including 15 dine-in restaurants.
“The fivefold revenue growth has consequently not come from one product or campaign. It is the result of wider distribution, sharper value, continuous menu innovation, stronger operational execution and a much clearer proposition for the Indian consumer,” says Bamania.
(Published in Financial Express)
admin
February 18, 2026
Kartikay Kashyap, BrandWagon, Financial Express
18 February 2026
IKEA HAS BEEN around in India for about eight years, with another three years before that spent studying the market. It has developed a range that it deems “locally relevant-like the roti maker, the tava (pan), the belan (rolling pin), and the pressure cooker -which now constitute about 50% of the products it offers in the country. It has shifted its communication strategy to sync with local culture and fit into local spaces and has worked hard to beef up its omnichannel sales model with about 30% of its sales originating online. But profitability has remained elusive for the retailer whose global sales reached approximately €45billion in the 2015 financial year (FY25).
Just for context, the company’s India entity widened its losses by about 29 to 1,325.2 crore in the financial year ending March 31, 2025 (FY25). The revenue also dipped 3 to 1,749.5 crore from 1,809.8 crore in FY25.
So now the brand is taking a leaf out of its China playbook and tweaking its retail formats. Starting last year, it started piloting smaller store sizes ranging from 15,000-20,000 sq ft that are more cost-effective to set up and faster to integrate with its omnichannel model. “The goal is to create a simpler and more efficient shopping experience,” Ingka Group Retail Manager Tolga Oncu had said when the concept was unveiled last August.
Five months on, the furniture retailer is looking to take a step up the ladder – setting up new stores in the 50,000-70,000 sq ft range in the country, which will sit comfortably between its smaller stones (15,000-20,000 sq ft) and big box retail outlets (4 lakh sq ft), Adosh Sharma, country commercial manager at Ikea India told FE recently. Ikea’s broader plan also includes doubling its investments in the country to over 20,000 crore ($2.2 billion) over the next five years and improving local sourcing.
Will all this help the retailer grab a larger share of the highly fragmented furniture and furnishing market in the country? Will the brand achieve profitability in the next two years in keeping with its plans?
Ikea realises copy-pasting its global retail strategy in India is not going to work. That explains its recent moves to tweak store sizes and product design. Over and above the regular 5-M-L strategy, the fourth format the brand is developing comprises no-frills planning and order points, focused on customers who want to design homes or seek complex solutions without distraction.
“Smaller stores, which fulfill purpose-led needs will help them to get closer to their customers,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder & CEO, Third Eyesight.
The furniture and home decor segment has been up against slow purchase cycles in India. Smaller sized stores that are closer to residential arras might help step up the frequency of purchases. “Players are moving towards a higher purchase frequency strategy and smaller stores will help lkea cash in on this opportunity,” says Kushal Bhatnagar, associate partner, Redseer Consultant Strategy. He says quick commerce has helped improve the purchase cycle in the home decor space, and that is something Ikea will likely tap going forwand.
Dutta says Ikea has taken a long-term view on India and the investments in the pipeline is an indication of the opportunity that awaits players.
The brand claims it has served close to 110 million customers in FY25 across channels, and online sales are growing 34% compared to the previous fiscal. While furniture contributed the lion’s share of its revenue, the food business contributed 100% and Ikea for Business (tailored solutions for businesses) another 19% to its topline.
(Published in Financial Express)
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May 23, 2025
By Kunal Purohit and Ananya Bhattacharya, Rest of World
Mumbai, India, 23 May 2025
Online retail continues to elude India’s richest man.
The Shein India app, launched by Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Retail in partnership with the Chinese fast-fashion giant, has struggled to gain traction in a market where Amazon and Walmart have been fighting neck-to-neck for nearly a decade. Downloads for Shein India nosedived from 50,000 a day shortly after its launch in early February to 3,311 in early April, according to AppMagic, a U.S.-based app performance tracker.
In April, when U.S. tariffs hit China, the app saw renewed interest as it was in the news, but experts are unclear on whether this growth is sustainable.
“Unlike earlier times, now … [the] market is saturated with multiple options and offers, and user interest can quickly dwindle,” Yugal Joshi, partner at global research firm Everest Group, told Rest of World.
Kushal Bhatnagar of Indian consulting firm Redseer, however, sees the late-April spike as a healthy sign, given that Reliance has yet to run paid marketing campaigns for Shein.
Reliance Retail declined to respond to Rest of World’s queries about its partnership with Shein.
Reliance launched Shein for India five years after the original Shein app was banned in the country over border tensions with China. But the Shein that has returned is entirely separate from Shein’s global platform: Rather than selling made-in-China clothes and accessories directly to consumers, Shein now operates as a technology partner, while Reliance Retail handles the heavy lifting — from sourcing and manufacturing to distribution. All consumer data is managed by the Indian company.
The partnership is part of Ambani’s broader effort to overhaul his retail business, whose valuation fell to $50 billion in 2025 from $125 billion in 2022. Although the company has made a push into digital platforms like JioMart, Ajio, and most recently Shein India, the bulk of its retail revenue still comes from its 18,000 physical stores.
Lagging behind Amazon and Walmart-backed Flipkart, which together control nearly 60% of India’s e-commerce market, Reliance has spent years trying to break into the sector. Between 2020 and 2025, Ambani’s group acquired majority stakes in companies spanning digital services, online pharmaceuticals, and quick commerce. But the investments have yet to position Reliance as a serious challenger to Amazon and Flipkart.
Analysts say the Indian behemoth hopes to leverage Shein’s artificial intelligence-powered trendspotting and automated inventory systems to pursue an ambitious goal: capturing a major share of India’s e-commerce market, projected to hit $345 billion by 2030.
According to Kaustav Sengupta, director of insights at VisionNxt, an Indian government-funded initiative that uses AI to forecast fashion trends, such a model is likely to make good use of Reliance’s humongous customer data sets: more than 476 million subscribers for its Jio telecom brand, 300 million users for e-commerce platform JioMart, and 452 million subscribers for its news and entertainment portfolio, consisting of 63 channels, a streaming service, and digital news outlets.
“With these data points, Reliance wants to now sell fashion products, so all it needs is a system where it can feed all these data points,” Sengupta told Rest of World. He said the model would be able to predict best-selling products and suggest the right prices for them.
The original Shein app uses AI-driven models for intelligent warehousing and to spot customer trends before manufacturing a new product. It scales the manufacturing up or tweaks the designs based on the feedback. At any given time, the Shein website has a catalogue of more than 600,000 items. Its Indian iteration does not match up, according to reviews on the Google Play store. Several customer reviews for Reliance’s Shein app are critical of higher prices and reduced options. The app’s rating hovered at 2 out of 5 until February; in May, it climbed to 4.4, but reviews were still a mixed bag.
Reviews of the Indian app highlight the disparity with Shein’s global version, criticizing higher prices and a reduced selection of categories and styles.
As of April 25, Reliance Retail said only 12,000 products were live on Shein India, a stark contrast to the 600,000 items available on Shein’s global platforms. While Shein is reportedly set to debut on the London Stock Exchange this year, Ambani’s years-old promise to take Reliance Retail public remains unfulfilled.
Reliance Retail, which accounts for around 30% of the conglomerate’s overall business, is facing a slowdown in annual growth. Its sales rose just 7.9% in the fiscal year ending March 2025, down from 17.8% the previous year. Meanwhile, shares of rival Tata Group’s retail and fashion arm, Trent, have soared by 133%.
“Reliance would have looked at reviving that momentum and riding on it, while for Shein, adding India back on its portfolio of markets could be a plus point before its proposed public listing,” Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a brand management consultancy that has worked with various global e-commerce brands including Ikea, told Rest of World.
A Reliance Retail official privy to information about its fast fashion expansion plans told Rest of World the partnership with Shein also hinges on global manufacturing ambitions as the Chinese company is trying to “source its products from other countries like India” to meet the “additional demand that is coming from newer markets.” Reliance Retail has tapped a network of small and midsize Indian manufacturers to locally source products, and its subsidiary Nextgen Fast Fashion Limited is leading the charge. “We need to first scale up our domestic manufacturing, before our partnership starts manufacturing for global markets. Let us see how that goes, first,” the official said, requesting anonymity as he is not authorized to share this information publicly.
India’s Gen Z population is at 377 million and counting, and their spending power is set to surpass $2 trillion by 2035, according to a 2024 report by Boston Consulting Group. Every fast-fashion retailer wants to capture this market, but it “is very new even for Reliance,” Rimjim Deka, founder of Indian fast-fashion platform Littlebox, told Rest of World.
Deka said smaller brands like hers “just see [a trend] and implement it,” which could take a large conglomerate months to do, by which time the trend may have lost relevance.
Reliance’s previous attempts to attract young shoppers with clothing brands like Foundry and Yousta failed to find much success. Anandita Bhuyan, who works in trend forecasting and product creation for fast-fashion clients like H&M and Myntra, told Rest of World the company has struggled to effectively leverage consumer data and target India’s youth.
According to the Reliance Retail official, the company is confident that if “there are 10 existing brands, the 11th brand will also get picked up as long as there is value and there is fashion.”
“Shein already has a recall among the youth. It gives us yet another brand in our portfolio through which we can cater to the youth,” the official said.
Shein was built in China on the back of more than 5,400 micro manufacturers — a scattered and loosely organized network of small and midsize factories.
In January this year, on a visit to China, Deka met with manufacturers working for Shein and Temu. On the outskirts of Guangzhou, Deka saw factories set up in areas that appeared residential, with “women sitting inside houses” making clothes.
“The tech is built in a way that somebody sitting there is able to see that, okay, next 15 days or next one month, how much I should be making … that is the kind of integration they have done,” Deka said.
Deka told Rest of World this model is easier to replicate at a smaller scale. “Me, coming from [the] supply chain industry, I understand that it is much easier for a brand like us because we are at a very smaller scale. We can still go to those people, we can still build it in a very unorganized way and then pull it off,” she said. Her company’s annual net revenue is 750 million Indian rupees ($8.6 million).
“[But] somebody like Reliance, they just cannot go haphazard here. … It has to be always organized,” Deka said.
Shein moved its headquarters to Singapore sometime between late 2021 and early 2022, a strategic departure to distance itself from its Chinese origins and facilitate hassle-free international expansion amid the U.S.-China trade war.
India is part of Shein’s wider strategy to diversify its supply chain — one that also includes a newly leased warehouse near Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, and efforts to establish alternative manufacturing hubs in Brazil and Turkey.
But in India, Reliance needs Shein as much as Shein needs Reliance for its global pivot. According to Bloomberg, Reliance Retail is focusing on creating leaner operations to weather a wider consumption slump in the Indian economy.
“It remains to be seen whether the Reliance-Shein combine can deliver on the brand’s promise with a wide range of products, fast and on-trend,” Dutta said. “In the years that Shein has been absent, the Indian market has evolved further, competition has intensified, and past goodwill is not enough to provide sales momentum.”
Kunal Purohit is a freelance journalist based in Mumbai, India.
Ananya Bhattacharya is a reporter for Rest of World covering South Asia’s tech scene. She is based in Mumbai, India.
(Published in Rest of World)
