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September 1, 2026
Vikash Tripathi, Outlook Business
1 September 2026
Eight decades ago, the ‘nationalist businessman’ GD Birla helped prepare the ‘Bombay Plan’, which asked the state to pro-vide for the bare minimum needs of its people. His plan asked for 2,800 calories of well-balanced food per day, 30 yards of clothing per year and 100sq ft of housing per person.
Today, seventh-generation Aryaman Vikram Birla is betting on an entirely different opportunity: premium dining. “We continue to believe in the remarkable potential of the premium casual dining space, spurred by rising disposable income and evolving lifestyles,” the 29-year-old said after Aditya Birla New Age Hospitality acquired KA Hospitality in 2023.
The Birlas are not alone in trying to cash-in on rising prosperity in India. In the past five years alone, India’s top 10 industrial groups have announced new ventures in consumer-facing sectors or doubled down on existing ones. A rough tally of these investments crosses ₹4.8 lakh crore.
For decades, these same business houses built their dominance in core sectors like steel, power, aluminium, cement and chemicals, laying the industrial backbone of the economy. This helped the nation become a large producer of such goods and, in some cases, an exporter as well.
But as India’s economic conditions changed, so has the focus of its largest conglomerates.
For the likes of Tata, Aditya Birla, Bajaj and Bharti, that journey started way back. “What has changed in recent years is the speed and openness of the amount of capital being invested,” says Jitender Kumar, associate professor and programme chairperson, retail management programme at Birla Institute of Management Technology.
“It is not ‘opportunistic’ reasons, it’s structural reasons.”
Two factors seem to be driving the shift: the first is the arrival of an affluent consuming class that can buy branded and premium goods, and the second is the attraction of consumer businesses as a way to diversify revenue and, in some cases, improve the quality of earnings.
The Rise of Affluence
A couple of decades ago, if an Indian household had some extra cash, it often meant buying more of the same. Today, it increasingly means buying better. Even salt is being upgraded, from iodised to Himalayan pink or rock salt. The same shift is visible in bigger purchases: sports utility vehicles (SUVs) over hatchbacks, and ₹1cr-plus homes over budget flats.
But India isn’t simply consuming more. It is moving from basic consumption towards discretionary, branded and premium consumption. This boom is most clearly seen in the rapid expansion of the financial infrastructure that enables consumption. Formal retail credit penetration has more than doubled over the past decade, according to a TransUnion Cibil report, driven largely by personal loans, credit cards and consumer durable loans. Meanwhile, the government-backed Unified Payments Interface has untethered spending from the cash in a buyer’s wallet.
The signs show up across the broader consumption economy. Homes priced above ₹1cr accounted for 54% of total sales in 2025, up from just 30% in 2023—the market that decorative paints and home solutions are chasing.
Out of 4.7mn cars sold in the financial year 2025–26, SUVs accounted for more than half.
“The consumer market has grown substantially—not only through rising incomes but also the dramatic expansion of branded consumption across product verticals,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of management-consulting firm Third Eyesight.
The bets are also getting more varied, from Reliance Retail tying up with global brands like Fenty and Skims to the Bharti Group bringing Olive Garden to India.
The Lure of Returns
For a passenger walking through an airport, the flight is only one part of the journey. There is coffee before boarding, food between flights, a lounge, retail outlets, parking and a host of other things to spend money on. For Adani Airports, those non-aero businesses are increasingly becoming the more lucrative part.
Its non-aero operations already generate about ₹2,500cr, with returns in the high-20% range, against roughly 12% from regulated aeronautical operations.
Jeet Adani, director of Adani Airport Holdings, expects the share of aeronautical revenue to fall to around 10% of total revenue, with non-aero becoming the bigger growth driver. The motivation can be seen as an escape from a return ceiling as much as a bet on rising affluence.
As Kumar puts it, consumer businesses help the conglomerates in two major ways. First, they help insulate them from volatile and often punishing commodity cycles, and second, they often offer far better returns with lower capital intensity and faster cash conversion.
Reliance Industries (RIL) shows how significant that shift can become. By 2025–26, its consumer-facing arms, Jio Platforms, Reliance Retail Ventures and Reliance Consumer Products, together contributed over 40% of group revenue and nearly 60% of operating profit.
And there is another advantage. “A small business, when it wants to build a new venture, faces constant margin pressure and often has to build its supply chain from scratch. A large conglomerate can leverage its existing scale, infrastructure and supply chain to enter a new business far more efficiently,” explains Kranthi Bathini, equity strategist at WealthMills Securities.
Different Strokes
In chasing consumers, some conglomerates are following the fastest-growing categories, while others are using their existing industrial capabilities to enter consumer-facing businesses. One is trying to build an entire ecosystem around it. But the lines between these approaches are not always clean.
Tatas is doing both: building entirely new consumer brands while also using the industrial ecosystem it has built over decades.
For Tatas, the consumer opportunity has largely been about following where spending is moving. Their consumer ventures have followed this arc longest. It began decades ago with Lakmé (1952), Tata Tea (1962) and Titan (1984). Tanishq and the expansion of Trent under brands such as Zudio are only the latest examples.
At Tata Consumer Products, once largely a staples business built around salt, tea and pulses, the focus has been shifting towards value-added foods and beverages, with ₹7,000cr spent on the acquisitions of Capital Foods and Organic India in 2024. Across companies such as Tata Digital, Indian Hotels, Air India and Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles, the group has announced close to ₹93,180cr in investment over the past five years.
Aditya Birla’s jewellery chain Indriya and its move into premium hospitality belong to the same category of ‘pull-based’ diversification.
JSW is taking a different route. It is taking its existing industrial strengths one step closer to the buyer. The group, which has traditionally been focused on areas such as steel, energy and cement, has expanded into consumer-facing areas such as auto, paints and home solutions.
It launched JSW Paints in 2019, and acquired a controlling stake in paintmaker AkzoNobel India for ₹8,986cr last year. Its strategy is to leverage an established network of contractors, dealers, architects and builders to reach consumers.
The same strategy can be seen in its push into autos, acquiring a 35% stake in the Indian unit of China’s MG Motor in 2024, leveraging synergies with its established steel business.
At Tatas, too, group companies like Tata Steel, Tata Power, Tata AutoComp, Tata Technologies and TCS are doing significant businesses with Tata Motors.
Adani is also using an asset it already controls to move further into the consumer’s wallet. Adani Airports announced a ₹20,000cr investment in June to develop hotels, retail, entertainment and commercial infrastructure around its eight airports, and has signed hotel management agreements with IHG Hotels & Resorts for five hotels. City-side developments could contribute 30–40% of Adani Airport Holdings’ non-aero revenue.
Yet another example of the extension strategy is Aditya Birla Group’s attempt to diversify from cement, metals and textiles into decorative paints with Birla Opus.
RIL took a different approach: trying to connect multiple consumer businesses into one ecosystem. It expanded its retail network through new formats and acquisitions, added brands and partnerships, and then built a consumer-goods business around acquisitions such as Campa Cola and Lotus Chocolate.
That expansion was helped by billions of dollars raised by both Jio Infocomm and Retail Ventures from foreign investors in 2020. The group now plans to spend another ₹8,000cr expanding consumer goods manufacturing. The advantage of having that kind of scale is clear. If RIL has Ajio at a mall and, next to it, GAP and Herschel, it can negotiate better rental terms.
For conglomerates, Kumar points out, the next level of competition will not be based on investment, “but on the ability to create different consumer experiences, foster innovation and create lasting brand loyalty through the integration of these capabilities”.
Can Scale Win?
When Reliance Fresh opened its first stores in 2006, it was part of a rush by some of India’s biggest business groups to crack organised retail. Aditya Birla Group, RP-Sanjiv Goenka Group’s Spencer’s and Kishore Biyani’s Future Group were all betting that organised retail could transform the way Indians shopped. What followed was years of experimentation, losses and, for some, eventual retreat.
Birlas essentially gave up on grocery retail after a decade of heavy losses and exited entirely.
Future was pushed into insolvency after a controversial ₹24,713cr deal with RIL. Spencer’s is still trying to find its footing, with ₹249.33cr in net losses in 2025–26.
Conglomerates may have deeper pockets, but that does not automatically make them better at selling to consumers. India has seen some of those bets fail or take years to work. And even among today’s biggest players, the results are still mixed.
Tata Sons has been in this segment longer than the Ambanis, yet its consumer businesses still make up less than 40% of its total revenue —a share that has not changed since 2020.
These groups have what most standalone consumer companies don’t: capital, distribution, infrastructure, brands, scale.
But winning consumers takes something else entirely—reading what people want, building brands, innovating fast and earning loyalty.
“In B2B [business to business], it’s about manufacturing at scale, getting your costs down. Then you can compete. In B2C [business to consumer], it’s all about the product. With the right product at the right price, you have a chance to win in the market,” Parth Jindal, managing director of JSW Cement and JSW Paints, told Outlook Business in 2025.
Tata Sons’ chairman N Chandrasekaran hit the same wall while revamping the group’s consumer unit. “I have the money. But I don’t have the team to run it,” he had told Sunil D’Souza while hiring him to lead Tata Consumer Products in 2020.
Reliance and Tatas have had the longest head start, but even their journeys show how difficult it is to turn scale and capital into consumer businesses. Birla, JSW and Adani are now trying to make that transition in their own ways.
A longer tail—Bajaj in hospitals, L&T in retail finance and education, Mahindra in insurance and hospitality, Murugappa in electric mobility—is playing it safer, going deeper into what it already owns rather than chasing new categories.
What ties them together is a bet on consumers buying not just more but better, and on those consumers being worth more per rupee of capital than the industrial customers who built these houses.
The prize is growing, but so is the competition. Capital and scale may get these conglomerates through the door. They won’t guarantee a seat at the table.
(Published in Outlook Business)
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January 30, 2026
Vashnavi Kasthuril, MINT
Mumbai, 30 January 2026
Reliance Consumer Products Ltd (RCPL) plans to enter the bottled iced tea market this coming summer with the relaunch of “Brew House”, three people close to the development told Mint. The people added that the brand—for which the company received approval on 23 July 2025, according to the commerce ministry records—is expected to be relaunched within the next two months. The oil-to-retail conglomerate acquired the brand in 2024 for an undisclosed amount.
The iced teas will be launched in two flavours, lemon and peach, for an entry price of ₹20 for a 200ml bottle, according to two of the three people. “The product was initially supposed to be launched for ₹10 for a 200ml bottle, but after the goods and services (GST) recast, the ready-to-drink segment falls under the ~40% GST bracket, so the company decided to start with ₹20 instead,” said one of the three people, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity. RCPL did not immediately respond to Mint’s emailed queries. However, multiple distributors also confirmed to Mint that “Brew House” will launch within the next two months.
FMCG ambitions
Apart from relaunching Brew House, RCPL is also evaluating launching other niche-category drinks. RCPL is also working on several new concepts, such as kombucha, prebiotic sodas, and ayurvedic drinks. RCPL now has the focus and capability to build a specialized route to market for these kinds of offerings. RCPL’s larger ambition is to be a full-scale fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) company, spanning categories across home care, food, beverages, and snacks, said the second person.
In August 2025, RCPL, the packaged consumer goods arm of Reliance Industries Ltd, acquired a majority stake in a joint venture with Naturedge Beverages Pvt. Ltd, the Mumbai-based company behind the herbal functional drink Shunya. Shunya offers zero-sugar, zero-calorie herbal beverages infused with Indian super-herbs such as ashwagandha, brahmi, khus, kokum, and green tea across India.
“When Reliance acquires a brand, one can be sure of product innovations, and you will see the same here,” said the third person. To be sure, the company has expanded its beverage portfolio to include a diverse range of beverages across mass and value segments, ranging from carbonated soft drinks under the Campa brand to packaged drinking water, sodas, mixers, energy and sports drinks, and traditional Indian refreshments such as nimbu pani, fruit beverages, and milkshakes. RCPL is also present in packaged foods through brands such as SIL, which sells noodles and other staples.
Brew House was launched in May 2017 by Siddhartha Jain under Positive Food Ventures Pvt. Ltd in Gurugram as a premium ready-to-drink iced tea brand positioned as a healthier alternative to carbonated and sugar-heavy beverages. It differentiated itself through real, whole-leaf brewing, lower sugar content and the absence of preservatives. Targeting urban, health-conscious consumers, the brand initially built distribution through cafés, hotels, restaurants, multiplexes and airports before expanding into modern trade and online channels. Its portfolio included flavours such as lemon and peach, sold in 300-350ml glass or premium PET bottles priced at ₹40-80. Singapore-based Food Empire Group later acquired a majority-stake to scale operations, before RCPL acquired the brand in 2024 for an undisclosed amount.
“The relaunch has been a bit slow. It’s available in small batches at Reliance Retail stores for now, but the company’s waiting for the right product, price point, and strategy before scaling it up. Over 2025, the focus has been on building distribution through larger beverage categories and investing in back-end capabilities, including automatic brewing equipment,” said the third person. RCPL has focused on building distribution through larger categories first. It’s difficult for a small, standalone brand to create reach, but a broad portfolio allows scale. Once that foundation is in place, the company can create a separate vertical for niche beverages like iced tea, the person added.
The niche drinks market
The ready-to-drink (RTD) iced tea category in India has long been shaped by major multinational brands and legacy beverage players, though it has remained a relatively niche segment compared with carbonated drinks. Hindustan Unilever Limited and PepsiCo first introduced Lipton Ice Tea in the country in the early 2000s through a joint venture, but the product was pulled back after an initial launch as consumers at the time were not widely ready for iced tea. It was later reintroduced in select markets with PET bottle formats in flavours such as lemon and green tea variants in 2011.
Coca-Cola and Nestle’s joint venture, Nestea, also experimented with bottled lemon RTD iced tea in the early 2010s, initially available in 400ml packs at around ₹25, before its broader rollout was scaled back while the JV evaluated consumer feedback. Aside from multinational brands, Indian companies such as Wagh Bakri have sold iced tea products, including peach-flavour premix packs, retailing around ₹95-100 for 250gm sizes online, though these are often powder mixes rather than RTD bottles.
Currently, Lipton’s bottled RTD iced tea is available in 350ml packs online at roughly ₹60, while powdered iced tea mixes such as Nestle’s 400gm pouches are priced at ₹200-230. In contrast, RCPL’s relaunch of Brew House will be brought to market in 200ml PET bottles at ₹20, undercutting these legacy players and signalling an aggressive pricing strategy.
To be sure, RCPL used a similar strategic playbook when it relaunched Campa Cola, one of India’s once-iconic soft drink brands. Campa, first introduced in the 1970s and marketed with the slogan “The Great Indian Taste”, was a household name in the pre-liberalization era but faded in the 1990s after global giants Coca-Cola and PepsiCo entered the market. Reliance acquired the brand from Pure Drinks Group in 2022 for around ₹22 crore and formally relaunched it in 2023 with variants such as Campa Cola, Campa Lemon, and Campa Orange, initially through its own retail channels and then nationwide.
Reliance’s move into iced tea aligns with its broader FMCG and retail strategy of identifying categories with long-term growth potential, according to Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight and co-founder of PVC Partners. While iced tea remains a niche within India’s overall beverage market, Dutta said it is seeing steady, organic growth, driven by the rise of cafe culture, increased eating out, and younger consumers’ demand for non-alcoholic alternatives. “Whether it’s consumed as a standalone iced tea or used as part of a cocktail or some kind of concoction, it’s a category that’s seeing increasing interest,” he said.
Reliance’s key advantage, Dutta added, lies in its distribution muscle and captive shelf space across its retail network, which allows it to scale new products more effectively than smaller, standalone brands. “Anything they put on those shelves and price well becomes an opportunity for growth,” he said, adding that the entry of a large player like Reliance is likely to expand the overall market rather than intensify competition.
(Published in Mint)
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November 18, 2025
Chris Kay, Krishn Kaushik and Andrea Rodrigues in Mumbai
Nov 18 2025
Just before dawn, Kashif Sameer joins dozens of couriers zipping across Mumbai to deliver items stocked in a basement of a shopping mall run by Reliance Industries.
“I make between 20 and 30 deliveries in a day,” said the 25-year-old, who had just driven a mile across the chaotic roads of the Indian megacity to drop off groceries ordered 15 minutes earlier. “It is very popular with customers.”
The buzzing activity at the so-called dark store, a mini-warehouse operated by Reliance’s ecommerce platform JioMart, is part of a renewed push by the conglomerate’s chair and Asia’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani, to reassert his company’s position in India’s retail market.
It has added hundreds of dark stores to operate a total of nearly 20,000 physical outlets this year — almost double its pre-pandemic size — as it battles for dominance against Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto in the country’s ballooning quick-commerce market.
“It’s a question of who runs out of money first,” said Arvind Singhal, chair of retail consultancy The Knowledge Company. “We will see some kind of a shakeout.”
Despite its large network of physical stores, Reliance has yet to corner the domestic consumer market like it did with telecoms a decade ago. It faces entrenched competition from established domestic and international rivals, as well as millions of kiranas, family-run convenience stores.
The sprawling Tata Group operates a wide range of consumer businesses, while global multinationals such as Unilever and Nestlé are important players in India’s household goods market.
Reliance Retail, the division that contains all of the conglomerate’s consumer-facing units, had shed tens of thousands of employees and closed underperforming stores following a bloated build-out during the Covid-19 pandemic and slowing middle-class spending.
But India’s most valuable company, which has a market value of more than $225bn and operates across oil refining, telecoms and entertainment, is expanding its retail reach again.
Reliance Retail’s latest results point to a rebound. In the quarter ending September, the unit reported revenue of about $10bn and profit of $390mn, up 18 and 22 per cent respectively from the previous year.
“Reliance’s scale in retail now is unmatched in India,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of consumer advisory company Third Eyesight, in reference to the breadth of the conglomerate’s business. “This scale is unique in India and rare in global retail.”
Ambani’s retail ambitions are being led by his 34-year-old daughter, Isha. In August, she detailed plans for Reliance’s consumer brands subsidiary, which has a portfolio including Lotus Chocolate and the recently revived nostalgic Indian soft drink Campa Cola, to reach $11.7bn in revenue within five years.
Ultimately, the goal was to “become India’s largest FMCG company with a global presence”, said Isha Ambani during Reliance’s annual meeting.
The company told the Financial Times that it continued to “reinforce its position as India’s largest retailer, expanding its nationwide network”.

While Ambani originally indicated that he wanted to list Reliance Jio Infocomm, the telecoms unit, and Reliance Retail by 2024, people familiar with the company said the retail unit was not ready to go public. The billionaire said the Jio listing could happen in the first half of next year.
“Competitive intensity in every category in the discretionary retail side has picked up very sharply,” said Karan Taurani, executive vice-president at Elara Capital, who does not expect Reliance Retail to float for at least two years. “New competitors, new brands have come in and they are challenging the larger incumbents.”
The Ambanis, who operate as gatekeepers for foreign companies seeking access to India’s massive but challenging business landscape, have sought to cement their position through a spate of partnerships with western retail brands.
Foreign brands including West Elm, Pottery Barn and Superdry have stores in Reliance’s shopping malls in upmarket Mumbai. However, those joint ventures have largely struggled to gain traction with shoppers in India, where the per capita income remains less than $3,000.
The conglomerate’s foreign brands business housing these joint ventures lost Rs2.7bn ($30mn) in the financial year through March 2025, according to the latest available accounts. The Knowledge Company’s Singhal called Reliance’s push to bring international names to India “a vanity project”.
Reliance’s high-profile partnership with fast-fashion retailer Shein has also been underwhelming. The company returned to India this year under Reliance’s wing after being booted out in 2020 when relations between New Delhi and Beijing soured following military clashes along their disputed border.
Shein’s app has been downloaded just 11mn times, according to market intelligence firm Sensor Tower. Its discount prices are largely matched, if not undercut, by many Indian ecommerce and fashion retailers, say analysts.
Reliance is investing heavily in quick commerce, where deliveries are promised in 30 minutes or less. Bank of America estimates the market could reach $128bn by 2030.
The field is at present dominated by Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto, which together control more than 90 per cent of the quick commerce delivery market and compete with Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart. None of the companies are profitable.
The Ambanis are eager to catch up. Over the past six months, Reliance has built about 600 dark stores across cities to plug gaps in its vast store network. By contrast, market leader Blinkit operates about 1,800 dark stores.
In quick commerce, “we have to be there because everybody is”, said a person close to the conglomerate. “It is a long-term strategy.”
On a call with analysts last month, Reliance Retail’s finance chief Dinesh Taluja admitted to delays in entering quick commerce. But he insisted that Reliance offered better prices, more variety and wider reach across smaller Indian cities where it is often the only formal retailer.
“The competition today is mainly in the top 10, 20 cities,” Taluja said. “We are present in almost a thousand cities. Competition will take many years to reach where we already have a head start there.”
Still, Reliance was facing an uphill battle, warned Elara’s Taurani. “JioMart is making a late entry,” he said, “it will be very tough to disrupt players here.”
(Published in Financial Times, all copyrights owned by FT)
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August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
admin
July 28, 2024
Writankar Mukherjee, Economic Times
Kolkata, 28 July 2024
Top retail chains such as Reliance Retail, Shoppers Stop and Spencer’s Retail are facing a prolonged slowdown in consumption, pushing them to exit unprofitable markets, raise debt and control costs.
India’s largest retailer Reliance Retail shuttered 249 stores in the three months ended June. The company is also going slow on expansion, opening 331 new stores in the quarter compared to 470-800 stores opened every quarter in FY22, FY23 and FY24. The closures mean the retail business of Reliance Industries made 82 net new store additions last quarter–the lowest in 15 quarters.
Spencer’s Retail has decided to completely exit North and South India markets by closing 49 stores in the National Capital Region (NCR), Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. The step will erase Rs 490 crore of annual revenue, but the company is hopeful it will improve profitability.
Shoppers Stop chief executive officer Kavindra Mishra told investors last week that it may have to defer a few store openings this fiscal due to regulatory and other issues. The company will also borrow Rs 100 crore for expansion with demand remaining soft.
Meanwhile, V-Mart Retail has closed 22 stores in the first six months of 2024, as per its latest investor presentation.
“Pruning underperforming locations is a natural reaction during times of demand stress,” said Devangshu Dutta, CEO of retail sector consulting firm Third Eyesight.
Pure Economics
“Demand forecasting can never be perfect due to a lag between demand assessment and supply. Retailers now try to do away with underperforming stores at the bottom of the pile quickly. Earlier there were prestige issues in shutting down stores, but now it’s acceptable industry practice and pure economics,” said Third Eyesight’s Dutta.
Analysts say most retailers expanded rapidly after the pandemic, banking on pent-up demand and revenge shopping at the time. With demand turning sluggish, the industry is now being forced to take various steps to sustain operations. At Reliance Retail, net profit rose by a modest 4.6% from a year earlier in the June quarter to Rs 2,549 crore while revenue grew 6.6% to Rs 66,260 crore. It was the slowest pace of revenue growth and came after a 9.8% increase in Q4FY24. Net profit and revenue from operations fell sequentially in the June quarter.
Spencer’s Retail CEO Anuj Singh told analysts on Thursday the 49 stores it is closing make up nearly 22% of revenue, but also Rs 56 crore of losses at the regional Ebitda level in North and South India. “They were a drag on the balance sheet. We will now focus on Uttar Pradesh and the East where there is a sizable consumption opportunity with a 250 million population,” he added.
Singh said the store rationalisation exercise and about 35% headcount reduction at corporate offices will reduce overheads from 8% operating cost to 6.3% of total sales. “We now expect to achieve Ebitda breakeven by March 2025 which will give us the option to raise capital,” he said.
Mishra at Shoppers Stop said demand remained subdued last quarter due to fewer wedding dates, long election season with polling dates on weekend, heatwaves, and high level of cumulative inflation. All these factors combined hit growth and volume recovery, except in value fashion and beauty.
More stores shut than opened
In fact, the sustained demand slowdown saw chains like Pantaloons, Spencer’s Retail and Nature’s Basket close more stores than they opened last fiscal. Retailers like V-Mart Retail, W, Aurelia and Titan Eye+ had a higher rate of store closures than openings in the March quarter.
(Published in Economic Times)